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A SURVEY OF THE ANTITRUST LAW OF
EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS
John H. Sbe nefield*"
1 THIN the world of commerce, long-term supply contracts
V are common. Manufacturers seek to establish dependable
customers and consumers hope for the security of a reliable supply.
Short of vertical integration no commercial arrangement accomplishes
these ends more efficiently than the several varieties of exclusive
arrangements.
The extent to which businessmen sign such agreements and operate
under the effects of their provisions while unaware of the potential for
violation of the antitrust laws is surprising. Part of the reason for this
lies in the nature of the relevant legal rules. For nowhere in the evolv-
ing area of antitrust law, with all its inherent abstraction and com-
plexity, is the ground more uncertain and the guideposts less helpful.
Courts have sought to avoid dealing directly with the core issues raised
by the exclusive dealing cases because of their own asserted defects as
triers of complex economic facts, and because of the inefficiency of
lengthy trials. Even were courts willing to shoulder the burden, in-
sufficient work has been done by economists to analyze the true effects
of these arrangements upon competition.
This survey studies the current law and makes some brief suggestions
as to how businessmen, lawyers and courts alike could, with both rea-
sonable fairness and efficiency, deal more successfully with the difficult
antitrust issues of exclusive agreements of all kinds.
THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO ExcLusIVE AGREE ENTS
Exclusive long-term supply agreements raise antitrust questions. To
the extent they have a restrictive effect on the operations of purchasers
or sellers, they impose the economic costs that antitrust policy associ-
ates with the inhibition of the free operation of market forces.
A long-term supply contract riay be framed as an agreement by a
purchaser to deal exclusively with a seller. Such agreements are gov-
*Member of the Virginia and District of Columbia Bars. A.B., Harvard, 1960; LL.B.,
Harvard, 1965.
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erned, though not necessarily prohibited, by specific provisions of anti-
trust law, including § 3 of the Clayton Act.' Also, supply contracts,
though not in form exclusive, may undertake to insure that all or
most of the requirements of the purchasers will be supplied by the
seller. Frequently, a purchaser will contract for the purchase of the
entire output of a seller. These "requirements" or "output" contracts
may also come within the scope of the antitrust statutes, including § 3
of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Sherman Act.2 In addition, supply
contracts in their various forms may raise other antitrust questions,
involving price discrimination or even monopolization.3
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
After the first twenty years of operation of the Sherman Act, the
Supreme Court announced a new standard of interpretation in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States.4 In the face of the Act's flat prohibition of
contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, the Su-
preme Court decided that under the "rule of reason," only those ar-
rangements in unreasonable restraint of trade were in fact touched by
the statute.
The reaction to this judicial construction was largely hostile. In the
presidential campaign of 1912, platforms of the three major political
parties advocated specific legislative definition of business practices to
be prohibited, and sought the establishment of a regulatory authority
to facilitate enforcement. If enacted, such proposals would, it was
thought, avoid the enervating interpretations of a too-cautious Su-
preme Court.
Congress responded in 1914 with the enactment of the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 The Clayton Act, dealing
with price discrimination, stock acquisitions and interlocking direc-
torates, also dealt with exclusive dealing arrangements.
The House of Representatives, after refusing to accept limiting
115 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
215 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3 Such contracts may promote price discrimination or even monopolization, and
accordingly trigger the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13 (1970) or § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
4221 U.S. 1 (1911).
s Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970)).
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amendments, passed a 'bill outlawing all types of exclusive arrange-
ments. For its part, the Senate after vigorous debate initially refused to
include in its version of the bill any prohibition of exclusive dealing,
under the impression that such arrangements would be covered by the
unfair competition clause of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Only
after the Senate-House Conference Committee produced a compro-
mise version which prohibited only those exclusive dealing arrange-
ments having the prescribed impact upon competition, did both Houses
of Congress agree on the final language. 6
The language of § 3 of the Clayton Act covers at least three types
of competitive arrangements: exclusive dealing, requirements contracts
and tying arrangements. Exclusive dealing and requirements contracts
are treated similarly by the courts, but not identically. Tying arrange-
ments are subject to substantially different legal standards.7
-6 Section 3 of the Clayton Act now provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or to make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or un-
patented, for use, consumption, or r;esale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor,
or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a com-
petitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale,
or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
The history of the debates is important for at least two reasons. First, the language
of the "competitive impact clause" of § 3 of the Clayton Act was at least in part drawn
from Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), which thus
provides assistance in exploring the intent of Congress. Second, the Supreme Court
in a major exclusive dealing case, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949) (Standard Stations) created much potential for mischief by misreading the
legislative history of the Clayton Act.
7 The position of the Supreme Court has been that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly
any purpose beyond the suppression of competion," Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), and that as a result they "fare harshly under
the laws forbidding restraints of trade." Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953). On the other hand, exclusive dealing arrangements
are said not to involve automatically the same degree of economic detriment. Ac-
cordingly, the standards governing tying arrangements are substantially more restric.
tive than those governing exclusive dealing arrangements. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Because the commercial function of tying
arrangements is quite different from that of exclusive dealing or other supply contracts,
tyihg will not be discussed further,'
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A course of dealing comes within § 3 of the Clayton Act if the fol-
lowing requirements are met:
(1) The seller must be engaged in interstate commerce and the
practice to be examined must take place in interstate commerce;
(2) There must be a sale, lease or contract for sale;
(3) The agreement must be concerned with goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies or other commodities;
(4) There must be a commitment by the purchaser to deal only in
the goods of the supplier; and
(5) The arrangement must produce as a probable result the defined
impact on competition.
Of these five requirements, the first four may be termed jurisdictional
requirements, and the fifth comprises the substantive requirement of
competitive impact.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICATION OF SECTION 3
A. The "Commerce" Requirement
Section 3 requires that the seller be "engaged in commerce" and that
the agreement occur "in the course of such commerce." Section 1 of
the Clayton Act defines "commerce" as used in the Act.8 In general
terms, § 3 governs a seller engaged in interstate or foreign commerce"
and applies specifically to an agreement reached in the course of such
commerce.' The language by its terms excepts those engaged in
8 That section defines "commerce" as:
* . . trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, or
between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any
State, Territory, or foreign nation, or between any insular possessions or other
places under the jurisdiction of the United States, or between any such pos-
session or place and any State or Territory of the United States or the District
of Columbia or any foreign nation, or within the District of Columbia or any
Territory or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States .... 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
- To simplify the syntax of the following discussion, "interstate commerce" will be
used as a substitute term for the convoluted definition of "commerce" in § 1.
10 Because of the requirement of § 3 that the subject matter of the agreement must
be for "use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof
or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States," 5 3 does not apply to United States export trade.
[Vol. 6:225
EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS
intrastate commerce, as well as those engaged in interstate commerce
who do not use exclusive dealing except in the intrastate portion of
their business activity.
The initial analytical step in applying § 3 is to determine if the sup-
plier is in interstate commerce. The courts have required activity in,
rather than an effect upon, interstate commerce. "Commerce" in § 3
cases has thus been construed to mean only that business activity "in
the flow" of interstate commerce." In United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co.'2 the court excluded from the scope of § 3 leases be-
tween lessor and lessee in the same state not requiring goods to pass
across state lines. Although the possibility exists that this restricted
reading of the term "commerce" will be relaxed by inventive federal
courts, it is fair to say now that the statutory language governs only
those suppliers whose business activity includes commerce flowing
between states or otherwise, as defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act.
A second requirement of § 3 of the Clayton Act is that the course
of dealing to be evaluated must itself have occurred "in the course of
such commerce."'13 Nevertheless, that requirement has been whittled
down over the years. For instance, where an interstate business located
in one state sells to buyers nationwide, even its sales to buyers within
the state of original location have been held to be in interstate com-
merce. The commerce requirement of § 3 was seemingly rewritten by
Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations) .4 Although
the appellant contended his requirements contracts with California re-
tail dealers were intrastate in nature, the Court concluded the contracts
in question inhibited dealings with suppliers in other states as well,
thereby affecting competition in both intrastate and interstate com-
merce.'
5
Further, the provisions of the Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 71-77 (1970),
enacted in 1916, expressly permit exclusive sales by a foreign supplier to an American
agent.
nIThis requirement of actual participation in interstate commerce is in contrast
to the scope of the Sherman Act which includes those not actually engaged in inter-
state commerce whose activities nevertheless have an effect upon such commerce.
See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
12264 F. 138 (ED. Mo. 1920), aff'd, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
13 It goes without saying that satisfaction of this second requirement should auto-
matically result in satisfaction of the first, though the reverse would clearly not
necessarily be true.
14337 US. 293 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Standard Stations].
Is d. at 314-15.
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What the Court seemed to indicate is that a mere impact upon inter+
state commerce will be sufficient to trigger § 3.11 It is clear from the,
language of the statute, however, that something more than an effect:
upon interstate commerce should be required before § 3 applies. This
is not to say that Congress could not have passed a statute such as the,
Supreme Court in Standard Stations appeared to be construing, but
only that it did not. Perhaps the most that can now be said confidently,-,
in view of this startling misreading of the statute, is that exclusive
dealing in interstate activities is clearly included, and that such a prac-
tice, though it be solely intrastate, if it produces an appreciable impact
upon interstate commerce, may be included-if the rationale of Stand-.
ard Stations is followed.
In the preferable view, the commerce requirement of § 3 is satisfied
if the supplier does some interstate business and the course of conduct
under review occurred in the interstate portion of his business.
B. The Requhement of a "Lease, Sale or Contract for Sale"
The language of § 3 requires a lease, sale or contract for sale, or the
fixing of a price, or the discounting from or rebating upon such a
price.17 Construing this aspect of the statute, the courts have required
a completed sale or lease, or a signed contract for sale.18 Refusals to
sell are not covered by § 3,19 nor are agreements of agency or consign-
ment subject to the terms of the Act.20
The term "contract for sale" produces some confusion. By addition
of this language, Congress obviously meant to specify something other
16Accord, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) (case decided
under the Robinson-Patman Act).
17 The statute, in covering the "fixing" of a price, may appear to operate upon an
activity not necessarily involved in the sale, lease or contract for sale, as for instance,
the submission of a bid. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that the statute must refer
to the fixing of a price only in the process of a completed sale, lease or contract
for sale. Any other analysis would lead to the conclusion that the lawmakers were
able to imagine a situation in which the mere specification of a price, even though
no goods were actually sold, had the effect of substantially lessening competition.
18FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); McElhenney Co. v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
19 McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959);
Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
875 (1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 821 (1954). A refusal to deal might provide evidence in a government suit
that completed sales by the same supplier were in violation of § 3.
20 FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
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than a sale or lease. Accordingly, Congress must have intended that
§ 3 would reach an executory contract for sale, or a general supply
contract to be implemented by separate and periodic sales. Both pos-
sibilities have been sanctioned by the courts.21 Indeed, in B. S. Pear-
sall Butter Co. v. FTC22 the court went so far as to say that an agree-
ment, though lacking in elements required to make it a contract for
sale, such as specification of price and quantity, did form the basis for
subsequent sales and the parties were therefore estopped to deny its
status as a contract for sale.
Aside from this possibility of "contract by estoppel," courts some-
times have difficulty distinguishing between a sale or contract for sale,
on the one hand, and agency or consignment agreements on the other.
Where under traditional agency law an agreement leaves title and con-
trol over goods in the seller and the other party is not empowered to
act inconsistently therewith, § 3 has been held not to apply.?
Nevertheless, in the recent Supreme Court case Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 24 the distinctions under the antitrust laws between agency or
consignment and sale have been weakened. The Court, in reviewing
a so-called consignment agreement under which the consignor con-
trolled prices and retained title while the consignee bore the responsi-
bility of loss and received a guaranteed commission, held the agree-
ment in violation of the Sherman Act. But more importantly here, the
Court gratuitously stated that a consignment might not be employed
as a "cloak" to circumvent the prohibitions of § 3 of the Clayton
Act.25 Yet this view was expressed as dictum, and is further suspect
in that the opinion ignored the fact that the language of § 3 is more
explicit than § 1 of the Sherman Act. If all the Court meant was that
the terminology describing the agreement will not be determinative,
that is surely correct. Most lower courts have fortunately read Simpson
as not changing the rule that agency or consignment agreements are
not within the scope of § 3.26
21See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); B. S. Pearsall
Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 F. 720 (7th Cir. 1923).
22 292 F. 720 (7th Cir. 1923).
23 Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Business Equip. Corp. v. Underwood Corp, 240 F.
Supp. 413 (SD.N.Y. 1964).
24 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
25 Id. at 18.
26 Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Business Equip. Corp. v. Underwood Corp., 240 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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C. "Commodities" Requirement
Section 3 of the Clayton Act governs the sale only "of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities . . ."
(Emphasis supplied). The grouping of the terms suggests a require-
ment of tangibility. Courts have generally adhered to this approach.
In United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Ine.,27 the court
explained the meaning of "commodities" in light of the ejusdem generis
rule of construction, so as to confine the definition to articles similar
to those specifically enumerated, thereby excluding others, such as
money which is not a commodity, but a medium of exchange. 2 In
short, the court suggested the term "commodities" be afforded its
usual and natural meaning. Thus, generally, tangible items have been
held within the scope of § 3, and other products have been excluded
from the statute's coverage. Loans, transfers of rights or privileges,
transactions involving money or credit, and services have generally
been excluded.
The distinction between tangible commodities and intangibles is un-
helpful when it must be applied to nontangibles, such as electricity or
natural gas. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas,
Electricity & Power Co.2 9 has been cited for the proposition that con-
tracts for the sale of electricity are apparently subject to § 3 of the
Clayton Act. The Penn Water case, however, primarily involved the
Sherman Act. Neither the opinion of the court of appeals nor that of
the district court, nor any of the briefs in the court of appeals, ad-
dressed the issue of whether electricity was a commodity within § 3.
The same problem exists with respect to gas. In an early case,30 it
was held that acetylene gas was not within the scope of § 3. However,
more recently, courts have assumed that natural gas was a commodity.."
Modern physics has made matter of nontangibles. The courts will no
doubt stay in step by likewise enlarging the concept of "commodities"
for § 3.
27 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
28 Id. at 648-49.
29 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950). See also State ex rel.
Spilman v. Interstate Power Co., 118 Neb. 756, 226 N.W. 427 (1929).
80 Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 276 F. 537 (6th Cit. 1921).
31 B. & W. Gas, Inc. v. General Gas Corp., 247 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ga. 1965); Rural
Gas Service, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 912 (1961).
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D. The Requirement of Exclusivity
The final jurisdictional requirement of § 3, and the most important,
is that the transaction under review must include a commitment by
the purchaser not to deal in the products of a competitor of the sup-
'plier. This commitment to exclusivity may be in the form of a "con-
dition, agreement, or understanding."
The finding of a commitment to exclusivity on the part of a pur-
chaser or lessee triggers the operation of § 3.12 But a purchaser uni-
laterally deciding to trade only with a single supplier, though not mak-
ing any legal commitment to that effect, will not be a party to an
exclusive dealing agreement violative of § 3.
The commitment to exclusivity, once legally concluded, is not
exculpated by its desirability from the purchaser's point of view, or his
willingness in having undertaken it. Such factors, though perhaps rele-
vant to the transaction's effect upon competition,3 do not bear upon
the 'existence vel non of the commitment to exclusivity. Of course, a
commitment into which the purchaser has been coerced by the tactics
of the seller is clearly covered by § 3.
Normally the condition or understanding not to deal in the goods
of a competitor of the supplier is stated explicitly in the agreement
between supplier and purchaser. There have been cases, however, in
which the courts have inferred an exclusionary condition from the pat-
tern of dealings between supplier and purchaser.34 Such inferences
have typically been drawn where the seller makes it clear to the pur-
chaser by words, actions, or example that disloyalty in the form of
dealing with competitors of the supplier will be disadvantageous to
the purchaser. 35
In any event, the seller should not be precluded from using hard-
sell tactics to induce a buyer to concentrate on the seller's products,
32 The gravamen of a Section 3 violation is the forbidden condition, agreement or
understanding of exclusivity, and a proper pleading should assert this ultimate
fact. It makes no difference whether this is voluntary or is imposed by coercion,
but without such agreement, condition or understanding, there can be no statu-
tory infraction. It is only in the presence of this essential element that considera-
tion must be given as to whether competition may be substantially lessened or
whether there is any tendency toward monopoly.
McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co, 269 F.2d 332, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1959).
23 See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
84See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
S,5 Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cit. 1959); Englander
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
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nor should a seller be inhibited from terminating an arrangement pro-
ducing, by accepted and reasonable standards, unsatisfactory results.38
'The courts have not yet gone so far.
The clearest grounds for inferring exclusive dealing are the exten-
sion of favorable treatment to those who as a matter of practice do
not deal in the goods of a competitor of the supplier, or the imposi-
tion of onerous terms upon those who do. Accordingly, exclusive
dealing has been found where customers are given preferential dis-
counts if they deal only in the supplier's products, 37 or where such
customers are permitted special privileges, such as the privilege of
returning unsold goods.38
Similarly, if penalties are imposed upon those who deal in the goods
of a competitor of a supplier, courts have been quick to infer exclusive
dealing agreements as to those customers who decline to deal with the
competitor. In Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC,9 the withholding of
service information from service stations not dealing exclusively with
the supplier gave the court grounds for inferring exclusive dealing.
Punitive payments required from those who deal with competitors or
the requirement of surrender of the right to use the trade name of
the seller are also grounds permitting inference of the requisite com-
mitment to exclusivity.40
In summary, the required commitment to exclusivity will frequently
be explicitly defined in the agreement between purchaser and seller.
In any event, in appropriate circumstances, courts will infer such a
commitment from the pattern of conduct of purchaser and supplier.
E. Exclusivity in Requirements and Partial Requirements Contracts
Supply contracts sometimes take the form of contracts to supply the
total or partial requirements of the customer. It can readily be seen
that a total requirements contract is simply a variation of an exclusive
dealing contract, for if the customer must look to a given supplier for
all requirements of the product, no opportunity exists for transactions
involving that product with a competitor of the supplier.
66 See, e.g., United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
37 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
38 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); Q.R.S. Music
Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926).
39 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
40 Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Oxford Varnish Corp. v.
Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
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Yet, total requirements contracts are not identical to exclusive deal-
ing contracts. The classic exclusive dealing contract prohibits the cus-
tomer from dealing in any goods of a competitor of the supplier. A
total requirements contract, in effect, prevents the purchaser from.
dealing with a competitor of the supplier, but normally only with re-
spect to one product. Thus, the total requirements contract is less,
restrictive than the classic exclusive dealing agreement.
Nevertheless, courts have treated requirements contracts as falling
within § 3 of the Clayton Act.41 This broader reading of § 3 also may
support the statute's application to tying agreements, where the com-
mitment to exclusivity is restricted to one product (the tied product)
in addition to that the purchaser desires to acquire (the tying product)
from the supplier. Thus, while the exclusive dealing contract extends
exclusivity to all products, the § 3 tying arrangement embraces only
one additional product, and the requirements contract, only additional
amounts of the same product the customer initially desires to purchase.
Note that the requirement of exclusivity is being differently applied
to various practices.42 In view of the varying business reasons for
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, and the contrasting court
attitudes toward these practices, shifting application of the exclusivity
requirement may not be surprising. But because requirements contracts
are assumed to be simply reworded exclusive dealing contracts, though
they are not in fact, the interpretation of § 3 to produce application
of the statute even to requirements contracts may imply expanded
coverage not foreseen by the authors of the statute. On the other hand,
if the impact upon competition of the two kinds of contracts is simi-
lar, the original congressional policy clearly covers requirements con-
tracts, even if the language of the statute plainly does not.
A legitimate question at this point is why the requirement of a com-
mitment to exclusivity is relaxed, but on the other hand, the require-
ment of a "commodity" is strictly construed. An amendment to the
statute to harmonize the policy and the language would seem to be in
order.
41Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). See also Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949).
42 Of course in some instances a commitment in the form of a tying agreement
may be in effect a total requirements contract, because the purchaser will necessarily
have no additional need for the tied product. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
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Even without such an amendment, the statute can be extended to
cover requirements contracts without violence to the statutory scheme
and without unduly expanding its scope. It is now commonly accepted
that one of the purposes of enacting the Clayton Act was to bolster
antitrust enforcement by outlawing practices in their incipiency which,
if permitted fully to develop, would constitute violations of the Sher-
man Act. Further, if requirements contracts can have an adverse effect
upon competition, it seems logical to analyze them under § 3, rather
than under § 1 of the Sherman Act alone, whose standards of proof
may be more demanding. A coherent analysis of actual competitive
impact upon the Clayton Act can adequately take into account the
fact that a contract is only for the requirements of a customer for one
product, rather than for all products. But this kind of analysis cannot
be characterized by the use of per se shortcuts, since such foreshortened
review will inevitably assume the conclusions for many of the crucial
issues to be resolved. What is thus called for is an extended balancing
of business justification against competitive impact.4
Partial requirements contracts are even less restrictive than total re-
quirements contracts. Where an agreement guarantees exclusivity only
to the extent of a stated percentage or an absolute amount of a cus-
tomer's total requirements, the customer is free to seek additional
supplies of that same product from a competitor of the seller.
But the same problem which results from analyzing full requirements
contracts under § 3 of the Clayton Act necessarily arises, in more
extreme form, where partial requirements contracts are involved. Those
seeking to subject partial requirements contracts to § 3 must argue
that the language in the statute requiring a commitment to exclusivity
applies to any amount less than the customer's total requirements, as
long as that amount is substantial enough to have a market impact. If
the argument is made without the requirement of substantiality, analysis
soon reaches the absurd position that a sale of any item is an exclusive
dealing agreement, or at least a partial exclusive dealing agreement,
because to that extent the customer is precluded from dealing in the
goods of a competitor of the seller.44
43 See discussion of analysis of "Competitive Effect," p. 243 infra.
44While such a position may not appeal to common sense, it has persuaded at
least one court with the result that a utility's underground plans were held to be
exclusive dealing under § 3 because their practical effect was a commitment not to
deal in some, but not necessarily all, or even most, appliances of the utility's corn-
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Cases involving partial requirements contracts, described as such, are
.rare under § 3. One clear reason is that cases that are partial require-
inents cases are instead analyzed as total requirements cases. Such an
approach was utilized in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,4
in which a supply of coal for a specific generation facility was con-
tracted for, athough the electric company was not required to use
coal at the facility nor was it inhibited from procuring coal from com-
petitors of the supplier for use at other facilities. The trial court and
the appeals courts chose to handle the contract as a full requirements
contract, no doubt taking into account that it covered all coal require-
ments of Tampa Electric foreseeable at the time of the contract's exe-
cution.46
The courts may be reluctant to apply § 3 to partial requirements con-
tracts, as such. This would seem to be consistent with the exclusivity
language of § 3. Antitrust enforcement is probably not damaged by
such reluctance since § 1 of the Sherman Act is available for use. How-
ever, even if some courts do choose to jam partial requirements con-
tracts into § 3 framework, the substantive requirement of that section
can be depended upon, if properly interpreted, to treat the practice
fairly.
F. The Requirement of Anticompetitive Effect
Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits those sales, leases or con-
tracts for sale involving a commitment to exclusivity only where the
effect of such transactions ". . . may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 47 Thus,
once all the jurisdictional requirements of § 3 are satisfied, the statute
still contains a substantive requirement of defined impact upon compe-
tition before the course of dealing under examination may be held
unlawful.4 The nature of the substantive requirement compels analysis
petitor. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 309 F. Supp. 1119
(E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
45 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
46 See also Fashion Originators Guild Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Judson L.
Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945).
47 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
48 The language of the substantive requirement in § 3 is similar to the language
in the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1970), which mention the same anticompetitive effect. Much of the law
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to delineate the market, both geographic and product, in which the
effect upon competition will be assessed. The purpose of such analysis
is to examine that relevant market to determine the extent of the impact
upon competition and, finally, in defining the anticompetitive effect
to gauge whether its likelihood rises to the level of "probability" re-
quired by the terms of § 3.49
The concept of "probability" is at the heart of the distinction be-
tween § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Sherman Act. Congress, in
enacting the Clayton Act, sought to reach practices not serious enough
to be violations of the Sherman Act, yet containing the likely poten-
tial, if unarrested, of becoming Sherman Act violations. Recognizing
the cost of delaying antitrust enforcement until trade had actually
been restrained, the Clayton Act anticipates the operation of the Sher-
man Act by prohibiting restraints of trade in their incipiency.
Yet the mere possibility of such anticompetitive results has been
held insufficient to produce a finding of illegality under § 3. If the
qualifying language of § 3 has any function at all, it is to distinguish
those exclusive dealing contracts that the Congress sought to render
unlawful from those it intended to conserve. The allowance of a
showing of the mere possibility of anticompetitive effects would re-
duce § 3 to an undiscriminating ban of all exclusive dealing contracts.
The Supreme Court has consistently required a probability of anti-
competitive effect:
[Section 3] deals with consequences to follow the making of the re-
strictive covenant limiting the right of the purchaser to deal in the
goods of the seller only. But we do not think that the purpose in
using the word "may" was to prohibit the mere possibility of the
consequences described. It was intended to prevent such agreements
as would under the circumstances disclosed probably lessen competi-
tion, or create an actual tendency to monopoly. That it was not in-
tended to reach every remote lessening of competition is shown in
the requirement that such lessening must be substantial.5°
interpreting the requirement in one section has been freely used to assist in the
exploration of the meaning of the other sections.
49The so-called "reasonable probability" standard is found in the specific language
of the Clayton Act, which prohibits exclusivity "where the effect . . . may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce." (Emphasis added).
50 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922).
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In Tampa Electric, forty years later, the Court again stated that an
exclusive dealing arrangement does not violate § 3 "unless the court
believes it probable" that anticompetitive effects will follow.51
The requirement of probability is only meaningful where courts
evaluate exclusive dealing contracts in terms of all the relevant circum-
stances. An invalidation of an exclusive dealing contract, simply be-
cause it involves a certain dollar volume of commerce, leaves no room
for assessment of the degree of probability that anticompetitive effects
would result from implementation of the exclusive dealing contract.
In any event, the language of the statute appears to require a finding
of probability of anticompetitive effect, and the courts have for the
most part so held.
1. The product market
Before the exclusive dealing agreement's impact upon competition
can be properly determined, the appropriate product market, or "line
of commerce," in which to measure such an effect must be identified.
The process of product market delineation is essentially the same under
§ 3 as in other cases where market definition is necessary, including
those involving § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 2 of the Sherman Act. 2
The guiding principle in antitrust market definition is that products
and their substitutes must be considered together, with regard to their
"reasonable interchangeability." 53 In United States v. E.L du Pont de
Nemours & Co.,5 4 the Court defined "reasonable interchangeability"
in terms of use, price and physical characteristics. Of these, use was
considered the most important. 5 Thus, identical products are clearly
within the same market. A product and its alleged substitutes will be
considered within the same market if their end-use is the same. Even
51 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
52 Though the proof requisite to a finding of a violation of § 3 of the Clayton
Act is less than that required for a finding of a violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act, (citations omitted) a demarcation of the relevant market is as essential to
one as to the other; and the standard used in determining the proper relevant
market is the same.
United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
53 The outer boundaries of the product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product'
itself and substitutes for it.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294, 325 (1962).
54 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
55 Id. at 395-96.
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products so physically dissimilar as glass bottles and metal cans have
been considered in the same product market because their end-use
competition was "insistent, continuous, effective and quantity-wise
very substantial." 56 Consequently, it is settled that even if the arena
of competition cuts across normal industry lines, so must the antitrust
conception of relevant product market, for only then can the impact
of the practices under review be adequately measured.
In situations where two products are not physically identical and it
is unclear whether they compete directly in end-use, the price re
sponsiveness of one to the other-another measurement of demand
cross-elasticity-may provide evidence that the two products belong
in the same product market.57 Thus, if there is economic evidence that
consumers will switch back and forth from one product to the other,
depending upon price level, it is said that the products have a high
cross-elasticity of demand and are involved in the same product
market.58
In International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States,59 comparisons'
of customer demand, price levels and total receipts showed that champ-
ionships boxing contests constituted a market separate and apart from
professional boxing contests generally. Thus, in a close question, a show-
ing of a certain level of price responsiveness may be determinative. The
crucial inquiry, not yet answered either by economists or courts, is the
degree of cross-elasticity that will be considered conclusive. 0 The
result is that product markets are unlikely to be defined with certainty.
There are two different ways of handling market boundaries where
the classic tests of cross-elasticity or substitutability do not yield clear
results. First, the example of § 7 of the Clayton Act can be followed
so that the market is made more inclusive, but various more restricted
56 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453 (1964).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
58 An element for consideration as to cross-elasticity of demand between products
is the responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other.
If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of
customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would be an
indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them; that the
products compete in the same market.
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956) (footnote
omitted).
59 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
60 For a discussion of this problem and others in defining relevant product markets;
see Dirlam & Stelzer, The DuPont-General Motors Decision: In the Antitrust Grain,
58 COLuM. L. Rav. 24, 38-42 (1958).
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-submarkets are also defined. An acquisition is then examined within the
,context of both the market and the included submarkets. 61 The use of
submarkets in § 7 analysis has been explained by reference to the lan-
guage in § 7 calling for an examination of the effect of the acquisition
in any line of commerce, thus suggesting the possibility of more than
one. Precisely the same language is found in § 3.
The Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States62 described the
method of delineating submarkets in terms of ". . . examining such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as
a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." 6
As a result it appears that initial market determination in difficult
-cases may not be crucial if the definition errs on the side of inclusive-
ness, because submarket delineation can correct the distortion.
On the other hand, a second means of resolving difficult market
boundary questions in the context of § 3 of the Clayton Act is to
define the market, where choice exists, more narrowly, in view of the
purpose of the Act. Because the statute was enacted to reach practices
in their incipiency which if full-grown might constitute violations of
the Sherman Act, it can be argued that such preventive medicine ought,
to be applied at the least hint of anticompetitiveness, which would
show up most clearly in a more restricted market. Also, it has been
-suggested that the large absolute size of defendants should be enough
to lead to narrow market interpretation, no matter the precise effect
on competition, because of the bias of the antitrust laws64 against sheer
bigness."
It seems preferable, however, to try to avoid result-oriented determi-
nations of market boundary, if for no other reason than to preserve
consistency. The language of § 3 requires only the probability of anti-
competitive effect, rather than its actual existence. Such a relatively
low standard of proof should adequately serve the intentions of the
enacting Congress to reach antitrust violations in their incipiency. It
61 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
62ld.
63 Id. at 325.
64United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 916 (1951).
65 Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 60.
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should not be necessary to further relax the standards of the statute
by gerrymandering the definition of the product market.
Accordingly, the product market in which the effects of the ex-
clusive dealing arrangement are to be examined is defined by the
standard antitrust principles of functional interchangeability and cross-
elasticity of demand. Submarkets can be defined in appropriate cases.
2. The geographic market
The second stage in defining the relevant market in which the effects
upon competition must be measured is to delineate the appropriate
geographic market.6 6 Failure to define properly the relevant geographic
market is fatal to analysis and can itself be the grounds for reversal 67
Two apparently contradictory standards for defining the relevant
geographic market have emerged over the years, and curiously, both
are mentioned in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.6s On the
one hand, the Court in that case described the process of selecting the
relevant geographic market by examining ". . . the market area in
which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably
turn for supplies." 69 But in selecting the relevant market, the Court
declined to analyze the area to which the Tampa Electric Company
could practicably turn for supplies, and instead focused upon "... . the
area in which these [coal] producers operated, and in which they were
willing to compete for the consumer potential." 70
The Court may have thought these two apparently contradictory
standards were nevertheless consistent in Tampa Electric. The opinion
reasoned that Nashville Coal and some 700 other producers "were
capable" of serving Tampa Electric, and that accordingly the area
into which the total production of Nashville Coal and its 700 theoreti-
cal competitors was sold, including most of the Atlantic seaboard area,
comprised the relevant geographic market. Whether this entire area
realistically meets the requirement that it be the market area of the
seller, here Nashville Coal, is open to substantial question.71
66 Section 3 does not include a reference to "any section of the country," as does
§ 7. Courts have not, however, hesitated to analyze the geographical dimension of
the relevant market.
67 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 327.
70 Id. at 331.
71 The choice as a relevant market of the area in which the supplier and its corn-
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Whatever may have been the intention of the Supreme Court in
Tampa Electric, many cases delineating relevant geographic markets
since that case have focused upon the area to which the customer can
practically turn for supplies. 72 And it is clear that in the § 3 context
this more restricted market definition best protects the buyer, whose
commitment to exclusivity may not be to his advantage, and is best
adapted to examine anticompetitive impact at an early stage. On the
other hand, it would be logical, in a suit brought by a foreclosed sup-
plier who is within the narrower market, to assess the impact of fore-
closure in the entire geographical area in which the supplier and the
foreclosed competitor compete. This might well be substantially larger
than the area to which any given buyer can practicably turn for sup-
plies, yet be a realistic context in which to measure the actual influence
upon the competition among sellers in given exclusive dealing arrange-
ments.
3. Competitive effect
The relevant product and geographic markets provide the context
in which the effect upon competition of the exclusive dealing arrange-
ment must be examined. The statute prohibits the exclusive dealing if
its effect within the relevant markets may be "to substantially lessen
'competition or tend to create a monopoly ......
In attempting to develop a legal standard under which a market
could be tested for the requisite anticompetitive effect, the Supreme
Court has announced two quite different approaches. The first, used
frequently in the earlier years of § 3 and authoritatively incorporated
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,73 (Standard Stations), con-
clusively presumes an exclusive dealing arrangement to be unlawful if
it is found to involve a share of the relevant market that the court
-decides is "substantial." This test, requiring "quantitative substantial-
petitors operate is inconsistent with the cases cited by the Supreme Court in Tampa
Electric. First, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), the relevant
market was thought to be certain western states in which Standard Stations operated,
-even though competitors of Standard Stations operated outside those states. Likewise,
in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the relevant market for
measuring the impact of a vertical acquisition was a multi-state area in which the
-acquired corporation sold its products, rather than the nationwide area in which
U.S. Steel and its competitors operated.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See also
United States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc, 202 F. Supp. 334 (D.C. Cal. 1962).
73 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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ity," may be reckoned in market share or absolutely, in terms of dol-
lars or in amounts of a given product.
The second test, known as the standard of "qualitative substantiality,"
was announced in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.74 That
decision's qualitative substantiality test considers the amount of com-
merce, however reckoned, to be only one of several factors to be
examined. In addition, the court reviewing an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement must take into account relative bargaining strength of the
parties, the length of the contract term and other economic facts.
which could be of assistance in evaluating the full impact of a given
pattern of exclusive dealing.
Standard Stations was handed down in 1949. Perhaps under the in-
fluence of its own reasoning in International Salt Co. v. United States,'-
in which the application of § 3 to a tying agreement had been made
to depend upon the amount of commerce affected, the Supreme Court
sought to transfer the concept to the exclusive dealing-requirements
contract area. After analyzing the legitimate economic and commercial
purposes that could be fulfilled by requirements contracts, the Court
nevertheless shied away from attempting to predict the probable im-
pact which the existence of such contracts would produce upon compe-
tition. Instead the Court developed an automatic rule applicable
whether or not benefits outweighed the disadvantageous effect upon
competition. 76
The result in Standard Stations was a condemnation of a pattern
of exclusive dealing contracts covering nearly 6,000 independent out-
lets, or 16%, in the relevant market. This condemnation came in spite
of the fact that Standard's sales under the contracts aggregated 6.7%
of the total gasoline and 2% of the tires and batteries sold in the rele-
vant market by all suppliers. Dominance of the supplier did not seem
to be a factor in the case, as it might have been in earlier cases where
similar quantitative standards were suggested.77 While Standard Sta-
74 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
75 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
76 The Court in Standard Stations applied the following inflexible standard:
We conclude, therefore, that the qualifying clause of § 3 is satisfied by proof
that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of com-
merce affected .... Standard's use of the contracts creates just such a potential
clog on competition as it was the purpose of § 3 to remove wherever, were it
to become actual, it would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity.
337 U.S. at 314.
77 See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
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tions controlled 23% of total sales, and its six leading competitors ac-
counted for 43%,78 the Court spoke of Standard's "minority share
of the 'line of commerce' involved" and alluded to the absence of any
recent increase, 79 and the trial court failed to make a finding of domi-
nance.
The standard of quantitative substantiality, not admitting of eco-
nomic or commercial justification, but operating automatically at a
given level of market share or dollar volume, produced a storm of
criticism.80 In general, the comment was to the effect that the auto-
matic standard resulted in a per se outlawing -of exclusive dealing
arrangements, except in de minimis circumstances, in the face of Con-
gress' intention to conserve those without harmful anticompetitive
impact. But it was twelve years before the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to articulate a new rule for exclusive dealing.81
In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 82 an electric utility
located in Florida constructed a coal-burning generation plant and
entered into a 20-year requirements contract with Nashville Coal Co.
to supply coal to the plant. The anticipated maximum requirements of
the plant were 2.25 million tons annually, about 1 per cent of the total
amount of the same type of coal mined and marketed by the 700-odd
coal suppliers in Nashville Coal's producing area. The value of the coal
for the full 20-year term of the contract was $128 million. Tampa
Electric brought a declaratory judgment action to test the validity of
the contract, and it was held to violate § 3 of the Clayton Act by both
the district court and the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court assumed, without deciding,
that § 3 was applicable. The narrow holding of the case was that the
trial court, in defining the relevant market too narrowly, could not
accurately have analyzed the market impact of the exclusive dealing
78 Some cases since Standard Stations have been content with foreclosure of even less
than 6.7 percent. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 993 (1964), in which the court found a violation where 5 percent of the
product in the relevant market was sold under requirements contracts.
79 337 U.S. at 298.
80 Typical of such criticism is Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevancy of Economic Factors
in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 65 HARv. L. Rmv. 913 (1952).
8 l Indications of a change in Supreme Court approach are to be found in ftC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
82 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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But the opinion goes much further than a mere reversal of the re-
sult below. Whatever else is accomplished in the case, Justice Clark
plainly sets the Court against a purely mechanical approach to the
determination of legality of exclusive dealing:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the
probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective com-
petition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the
proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total
volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the
market might have on effective competition therein. It follows that a
mere showing that the contract itself involves a substantial number of
dollars is ordinarily of little consequence . 3
Of the three factors mentioned, only one-the proportionate volume of
commerce-was in any way a legacy from Standard Stations.
The opinion also contains other pieces of evidence that the Court
had rejected an automatic and mechanical rule. In determining product
and geographic market, the opinion suggests attention to facts "peculiar
to the case," 14 and elsewhere refers to the relevance of "particularized
considerations of the parties' operations." ' And not only does the
opinion recite the various ways in which the relevant contract bene-
fitted both buyer and seller, but the opinion calls for a "weighing" of
those factors."6
Yet lawyers anxious to defend exclusive dealing arrangements should
beware of taking too much comfort from the Tampa Electric decision.
While it is tempting to hope that it represents a reversal of Standard
Stations and the establishment instead of a more flexible rule, subsequent
cases do not permit unrestrained confidence. While the Supreme Court
has continued to speak of the "lawful" exclusive dealing arrangement, 87
83.d at 329.
84 d. at 327.
85 Id. at 335.
86 Id.
87 Yet a requirement [sic] contract may escape censure if only a small share of the
market is involved, if the purpose of the agreement is to insure to the customer
a sufficient supply of a commodity vital to the customer's trade or to insure
to the supplier a market for his output and if there is no trend toward concen-
tration in the industry.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962).
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lower courts have nevertheless sometimes persisted in using what is in
effect a strict quantitative substantiality test.
The reason for this may lie in the nature of Tampa Electric itself.
First, as the Court defined the market, the amount of commerce af-
fected was less than 1 per cent. Accordingly, even under Standard
Stations, the requirements contract in the Tampa Electric was not
unlawful. It may thus be argued that the rest of the Tampa Electric
opinion is only helpful dicta.
In addition, the facts were quite different from those in Standard
Stations, and virtually every difference was in favor of the lawfulness
of the Tampa Electric requirements contract. The seller was not itself
dominant nor did the record show a large market share. There was
apparently no industry-wide practice, nor was there a substantial dis-
parity in bargaining power between seller and buyer. The contract
was of economic advantage to both buyer and seller, and indeed, the
buyer itself had brought suit, clearly demonstrating its desire for
specific performance. The contract, though significant in dollar volume,
was not significant in percentage of the market foreclosed. In fact
there was only a single contract involved, in contrast to the 5,937
contracts in Standard Stations.
Finally, in Tampa Electric, the Court left unclear the method of
evaluation of the various relevant economic factors to arrive at a con-
clusion on the ultimate issue of lawfulness. The enumeration of ap-
propriate factors to consider is helpful as a corrective approach to
Standard Stations. But unless some indication is given of the relative
weight of the factors or the order in which they are to be considered,
the logical trial of actual cases is impossible.
Perhaps in an effort to attain the simplicity of a working rule, or
perhaps aware of the factual differences between Standard Stations
and Tampa Electric, or perhaps content to rely upon that part of
Standard Stations reaffirmed by the subsequent decision, lower courts
have continued to isolate the proportionate volume of commerce in-
volved as a grounds upon which to judge the illegality of exclusive
dealing arrangements with which they have been confronted. Typical
of these cases is Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp.,"' in which the
court cites Tampa Electric but depends entirely upon the absence
of any evidence on the question of proportionate volume of com-
88 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965).
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merce involved as a grounds for dismissing the § 3 portion of the
complaint.89 In Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC,9" the court not
only cited the quantitative substantiality test as authority for its hold-
ing, but further implied that Tampa Electric was decided on the basis
of the same test. In Mytinger itself, in the market with percentages
most favorable to the defendant, it was found that competitors had
been excluded from 8.6 per cent of the potential sales volume. The
court found a violation, citing Standard Stations. The petitioners justi-
fiably sought to rely upon Tampa Electric, but were greeted with the
conclusion that that holding was "quite different." The court pointed
to the low percentage of market foreclosed in Tampa Electric, only
.77 per cent, and concluded that the case was irrelevant to a fore-
closure of at least 8.6 per cent. Had the qualitative substantiality test
been applied, the result in Mytinger might well have been different.91
What this history subsequent to Tampa Electric may signify is that
in actuality two parallel tests exist for assessing anticompetitive effects
of exclusive dealing agreements. It may well be that Tampa Electric's
qualitative analysis will be applicable only where the seller is not
dominant among his competitors, or foreclosure is moderate. On the
other hand, courts may tend to apply the Standard Stations quantitative
substantiality test in cases involving a seller in a position of dominance
within the relevant market, or where the extent of foreclosure is
excessive.
This thesis seems to be supported by an examination of the kinds
of cases in which the more flexible standards have been utilized. In
Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A-Liquidating Co.,92 the opinion justifies
exclusive dealing provisions on the grounds that they insure price
stability and reliable supply, and fulfill other similarly legitimate busi-
ness needs. Given the fact that the product involved was aluminum
extrusion, it seems highly likely, although the opinion specifies no
market share, that the amount of foreclosure in the relevant market
89 See also Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 618 (10th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966); 2361 State Corp. v. Sealy, Inc., 263 F. Supp.
845 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd and rein'd, 402 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1968).
90 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
91 It would have been relevant that the particular means of distribution under review
in Mytinger accounted for a negligible portion of the total product sales, and there
was little if any barrier to the establishment of unlimited numbers of additional
distributors.
92 290 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
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was negligible and that the seller was anything but dominant. Other
cases have used Tampa Electric to validate exclusive dealing contracts
accounting for less than 2% and 4% foreclosure in the relevant mar-
ket, respectively, and involving non-dominant suppliers.93
At least one lower court case confronts the distinction between
Standard Stations and Tampa Electric, and treats the former as having
been superseded by the latter. In Susser v. Carvel Corp.94 in the absence
of data demonstrating significant market foreclosure, the plaintiffs
argued that under Standard Stations the exclusive dealing agreements
were nevertheless unlawful. The court disagreed, however, on the
grounds that the inflexible Standard Stations rule had been altered by
Tampa Electric, in which the Supreme Court had ". . . erected criteria
which demand close scrutiny of the economic ramifications of an ex-
clusive dealing arrangement in order to determine the probable anti-
competitive effects of such a device." 95
The flexibility of the Tampa Electric approach should commend
itself as the clearly superior rule across the board, despite the nature of
the particular case, whether involving dominant suppliers or extensive
foreclosure, and without regard to the variety of business justification
adduced to support the form of agreement. Although the Supreme
Court in Tampa Electric did not choose specifically to overrule Stand-
ard Stations, it did clearly repudiate the mechanical approach with
its suggestion that a showing of a given level of foreclosure will rarely
be sufficient to invalidate exclusive dealing. The lower courts should
follow more faithfully the spirit of the Tampa, Electric decision, even
if they do not always understand the letter of its teaching. Only in this
way can logical consistency and business predictability begin to work
their way into this confused area of the antitrust law.
The factors that should b'e considered in evaluating exclusive deal-
ing include those mentioned in Tampa Electric and others which place
the exclusive dealing in the proper economic and commercial perspec-
tive. Once the factors are isolated, their relative importance and inter-
relationship need to be analyzed.
The qualitative substantiality test, properly applied, would begin-
though not end, as in Standard Stations-with an examination of the
93 See, e.g., Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Co-op Ass'n, 202 F. Supp. 481 (D. Ore. 1962);
Rural Gas Serv., Inc., 59 F.T.C. 912 (1961).
94 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 885 (1964).
95 Id. at 516.
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extent to which suppliers or customers may be foreclosed in the rele-
vant market, as an indicator of the effects on competition. This .could
be done by a determination, as prescribed in Tampa Electric, of the
volume of commerce affected by the exclusive dealing as a percentage
of the total volume of commerce in the relevant market, or the number
of outlets foreclosed by exclusive dealing could be assessed as a propor-
tion of the total number of outlets available in the relevant market.98
If the latter approach is taken, it should be supplemented by an
analysis of whether the outlets foreclosed are equivalent in terms of
efficiency, prestige or other quality indicia to those not covered by
the exclusive dealing.
Thus, the alternatives of the foreclosed suppliers to seek new or
different distributors are relevant. Where the number of customers is
limited, or where some peculiar requirement of capital or training serves
to inhibit the development of alternative customer sources, exclusive
dealing arrangements resulting in the foreclosure of any substantial
share of the market should usually be invalidated.
Similarly, even if foreclosure of a particular distribution mode is
significant, it is still relevant to inquire into the question whether that
necessarily precludes the foreclosed suppliers from reaching the ulti-
mate consumer. Consequently, if competition for the consumer is
affected only to the extent the foreclosed supplier loses access to a
particular distribution method, though he can readily supplant it with
an alternative system, exclusive dealing arrangements ought in those
circumstances not to be invalidated without further examination.
Another aspect of the foreclosure inquiry should take into account
the dominance of a seller in his industry. Exclusive dealing contracts
imposed by dominant suppliers have fared poorly partly because they
would seem to be less necessary for a dominant supplier and partly
because they are more likely to be coercive of the buyer, rather than
agreed upon between the parties. Courts have not precisely defined
the standards of dominance in this context, except to make it clear that
any of several leaders within an industry can be adequately dominant
for § 3 purposes. Logically, then, a newcomer firm in an industry
may utilize exclusive dealing contracts to gain a foothold but no blanket
98 As a practical matter, given the present state of precedent, a finding of fore-
closure amounting to in excess of 6% of the relevant market is likely to incline most
courts to at least a prima facie finding of unlawfulness.
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validation of exclusive dealing involving a newcomer is as yet provided
by judicial authorities.
Likewise, the relative strength of the parties to the exclusive dealing
agreement may reveal the extent to which legitimate business needs of
the parties are being thereby served. The finding of a gross disparity
in bargaining power will often suggest the seller has coerced the buyer
into participation. The existence of such coercion will almost certainly
produce a violation of § 3 if such bargaining power has resulted in the
foreclosure of any appreciable portion of the relevant market.
If the exclusive dealing is not clearly unlawful because of excessive
foreclosure, dominance or coercion, the analysis ought then to examine
the business justification for the practices. The contracts may have the
effect of reducing the costs of the supplier by providing a more de-
pendable market, with resulting reductions in selling and advertising
expense and more efficient utilization of capital, planning and research
resources. Likewise, the purchaser may be advantaged by obtaining
security of supply at a steady rate, never fearing either shortage or the
storage cost associated with oversupply. His average unit price ought
to be lower because his purchases can be spread out, not falling at a
time of peak demand on the supplier.
Similarly, the purchasers may be wholly dependent upon reliable
supply. Short of corporate integration, exclusive dealing arrangements
may be the only dependable means of assuring a steady flow of the
necesesary products. Antitrust law should consider more sympathetically
the anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing where the only other
feasible alternative for securing adequate reliability is vertical integra-
tion.
For substantiation of asserted business justifications, it may be useful
to inquire into the use within the industry of exclusive dealing con-
tracts by other suppliers. The business justifications of one buyer and
seller are likely to make sense for others, and it may well be that the
absence of exclusive dealing contracts in an industry suggests the in-
validity of the business justifications asserted in a particular case. On
the other hand, while networks of exclusive dealing contracts criss-
crossing an industry may demonstrate the validity of the justifications,
they would also have a greater adverse effect upon competition.
If the justifications are plausible, and the exclusive dealing arrange-
ments are not more anticompetitive than necessary to serve the stated
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business needs, courts should still examine the duration of the agree-
ments. It is this time period during which competition for particular
customers will be frozen, and consequently the number of years of
exclusivity may well be crucial.
But a given number of years does not have the same significance in
every industry. Where product development is rapid and price changes,
frequent, a long exclusive dealing agreement can be harmful. On the
other hand, a stable industry, particularly one which is regulated as to
price, should be viewed in a longer time-frame, and exclusive dealing
agreements of greater duration ought to be permitted.
Further, it would seem appropriate in this context to examine
whether the exclusive dealing agreements contain termination clauses
for the party committed to exclusivity at his option in the event imple-
mentation of the contract becomes unduly onerous. Where such pro-
visions are found in the agreement, or where the agreement contains
price escalation clauses which are effective, the burden of exclusivity
upon the buyer is less and the extent of foreclosure diminishes accord-
ingly.
On the other hand, if after examination, the asserted business justi-
fication is insubstantial, it would seem to be logical to sacrifice the ex-
clusive arrangements to the congressional policy of fostering active
competition. In any event, courts should not lose sight of the fact that
if exclusive dealing contracts have been widespread within an industry,
newcomers arguably should be permitted to avail themselves of the
practice, since any blanket prohibition after years of exclusive deal-
ing have established firm supplier-customer relationships would only
serve to ratify the competitive status quo.
One final test should be applied to situations where the examination
of foreclosure and dominance indicates that the exclusive dealing is
likely to be having some adverse impact on competition, and the busi-
ness justifications are weak. Before condemnation, some effort ought to
be made to measure the actual effect of such exclusive dealing con-
tracts upon competition. If it is demonstrated that competition has in
fact flourished, that new suppliers and new outlets have become avail-
able in the face of exclusive dealing, and that the suppliers availing
themselves of exclusive dealing arrangements have presided over a
declining market share, it would seem difficult to find the requisite
adverse effect upon competition. Of course it is possible to speculate
that, but for the exclusive dealing arrangements, competition would
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have flourished even more healthily and the exclusive dealer's market
share would have declined even more drastically. If evidence of any
such inhibiting effect exists, it should be taken into account and prop-
erly evaluated, but speculation ought not to be permitted to replace
proof.
The same standard ought to be applied to contentions that exclusive
dealing agreements have had the effect of bringing additional business
entities into the market-as for instance, new distribution facilities-
or have forestalled the trend toward vertical integration, as Justice
Douglas argued in Standard Stations. The first position involves the
difficult task of weighing loss of competition at one level of the market
against possible deconcentration at another level of the market, and
long-term benefits against short-term disadvantages. The argument that
exclusive dealing makes integration unnecessary should not be given
much weight since integration that is unlawful should be prevented
under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Nevertheless, the state of competition
in a market being tested for the effects of exclusive dealing is surely
relevant, and if competition has not been damaged, that fact would
seem to suggest the probable adverse effect called for by § 3 is unlikely
to evolve.
All of these factors properly belong in the qualitative substantiality
analysis. Any such evaluation of their impact serves to test the harmful-
ness of exclusive dealing agreements reasonably efficiently. The auto-
matic per se treatment of Standard Stations is avoided and yet the
analysis is still of manageable proportions.
II. OTHER RELEVANT ANTITRUST PRovisIoNs
Although the exclusive dealing arrangements are generally analyzed
under § 3 of the Clayton Act, mention should be made of § 1 of the
Sherman Act9 7 and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 8 The
method of evaluation of the anticompetitive effects of exclusive deal-
ing should be similar under all three statutes. But the Sherman Act and
the Federal Trade Commission Act, because of their less demanding
jurisdictional requirements, may be useful to government prosecutors
or private treble-damage plaintiffs when § 3 of the Clayton Act is
unavailable.
9715 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
98 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970).
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A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The relevant provision of the Sherman Act provides that: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. .. ." 9 Since Standard
Oil Co. v. United States' the so-called "rule of reason" is the basis
of the statute's application to all but the most clearly anticompetitive
activities.
It is frequently said, citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States,101 that practices not unlawful under § 3 of the Clayton Act
cannot be found unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act. This con-
clusion follows from the difference between § 3's outlawing practices
whose probable effect may be to restrain trade and the Sherman Act's
operation only upon accomplished restraints. Nevertheless, because of
§ 3's more specific jurisdictional requirements, it is conceivable that
a practice could fail to be held unlawful under § 3, yet fall under
Sherman Act attack.
Exclusive dealing arrangements are not unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act. Accordingly, they are subjected to rule of reason
analysis, which to a large extent parallels qualitative substantiality
analysis under § 3 of the Clayton Act. The market affected by the
restraint must be identified, the percentage of that market to which
the restraint applies must be assessed 102 and any factors which put the
restraint in the appropriate commercial perspective must be recognized.
If the percentage of market affected by the restraint under review
does not yield any clear answer, analysis must proceed to examine
the further factors that bear on the reasonableness of the practice.
Included among these should be the size and strength of competing
firms and their number, the history of defendant's market share, the
9915 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
100 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
101 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
102 The upper limit may be furnished by the monopolization cases under § 2 of
the Sherman Act which make it clear that arrangements affecting in excess of 80%
are likely to be held unreasonable. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945). The lower level can perhaps be taken from United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiavm, 347 U.S. 521
(1954), in which exclusive dealing covering approximately 50 percent of the relevant
market was sustained.
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ease of entry into the relevant market and other factors which permit
a balanced judgment as to the impact of the exclusive dealing arrange-
ment upon competition. In summary, the factors comprising the quali-
tative substantiality test under § 3 are just as relevant under § 1,
except that the Sherman Act requires actual anticompetitive effect
rather than the mere probability thereof.
One kind of exclusionary agreement which must be analyzed under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act is the "output contract," in which a supplier
commits to sell his entire production to a given buyer. It can readily
be seen that the language of § 3 of the Clayton Act, describing the
imposition by a supplier of conditions upon a distributor, is hardly
applicable to the output contract. If any restrictions are being imposed,
it is the requirement that the entire production of the supplier be sold
to the customer.
In situations where the customer owns the manufacturing facilities
and leases them to the supplying flrm,3 it might be possible to reach
an output contract under § 3 by treating the customer as the "lessor"
and to focus upon the imposition of restrictions upon the manufactur-
ing facility's production. Difficulty arises, however, because land and
attendant fixtures are probably not within the category of "commodi-
ties" specified in § 3. Similarly, even if that difficulty were surmounted,
the "condition" required is that the lessee not use or deal in the goods
of a competitor of the lessor, here the customer. Chaos can be the only
result. The preferable conclusion is clearly that § 3 does not apply to
a transaction in which the purchaser imposes restrictions upon the
supplier.0 4
Under the Sherman Act, output contracts are analyzed under the
rule of reason. A contract requiring a supplier, not a monopolist, to
.sell its entire output to a specific purchaser for a term of years is not
generally thought to produce serious anticompetitive results. Of course,
any purchase limits the remaining available supply to the extent of the
,amount purchased. But no anticompetitive effect follows therefrom
unless competing customers are denied necessary sources of supply.
The addition of a term of years by itself should not produce anti-
competitive effects, unless it could be shown that the arrangement,
103 This situation might obtain, for instance, where an electric utility customer owns
a coal mine but leases it to a coal operator.
104 See HALF. & HALE, MARTr PowER: SIZE AND SmHAE UNDER THE SHERMAN Aar,
-1 2.13 at 39 (1958).
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mutually beneficial at the outset, was likely to become harmful to the
supplier. If the agreement provides for no termination in such an event,
it is likely that a court will sense coercion, particularly if the pur-
chaser was disproportionately larger than the supplier or a special
reciprocity relationship between supplier and purchaser can be found.
The cases which have dealt with output contracts confirm this
analysis by exonerating a contract for the sale of an entire production
or output under the antitrust laws.105 But whereas a single output con-
tract may not be vulnerable to antitrust challenge, a group of such con-
tracts utilized as a method of suppression of competition or intended
to result in the monopolization of a given industry would have obvious
antitrust difficulty. In United States v. Reading Co.,' °6 the Supreme
Court, while acknowledging that individual output contracts might
not violate the antitrust law, stated that as a means of controlling inde-
pendent production they were clearly Sherman Act violations.
Thus, special circumstances, such as objectionable .provisions or
extraneous economic circumstances, may render the output contract
violative of the antitrust laws. But viewed individually, in the absence
of monopoly power on the part of the supplier or disproportionate
size on the part of the buyer, the Sherman Act does not now make
output contracts unlawful.
B. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Finally, it should be noted in passing that § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act 0 7 declares unlawful both unfair methods of compe-
tition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce. Under § 5, the Federal Trade Commission can enforce the
antitrust laws, including § 3 of the Clayton Act. In addition, however,
the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to invalidate practices
characteristic of, but falling short of classic antitrust violations.
Thus, practices which for jurisdictional reasons fall short of being
subjected to the Sherman or Clayton Acts may come within the scope
of § 5, and practices whose competitive impact would not satisfy the
standards required by the antitrust laws may also be subjected to
105Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913); Fargo Glass & Paint
Co. v. Globe American Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942
(1953).
106 226 U.S. 324 (1912).
10715 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970).
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§ 5 analysis. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,0 8 stated
that the purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act was to "supple-
ment and bolster" the antitrust laws and to stop in their incipiency acts
and practices which when fully developed would violate those acts.1 9
As a result, in a landmark § 5 case"0 the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the Federal Trade Commission was required to prove
that the contracts there in issue would produce a substantial lessening
of competition or a tendency to create monopoly, as would be re-
quired for unlawful exclusive dealing under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
It felt a lower standard of proof was appropriate under § 5, because
the Federal Trade Commission was empowered ". . . to arrest trade
restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an
outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the
antitrust laws." 111
It would seem the state of the law in this area under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act is unstable. If anything, the-Commis-
sion has moved back toward the Standard Stations emphasis on a fore-
closure percentage. A Commission proceeding obviously ought to take
into account the same kinds of factors as are recognized in the qualita-
tive substantiality analysis under § 3 of the Clayton Act. But the ex-
tent to which this is now Commission policy is unclear.
CONCLUSION
Exclusive agreements of all kinds should not necessarily be pro-
scribed by the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court has pointed the way
in Tampa Electric to an examination of such agreements that gives ap-
propriate weight to their affirmatively beneficial role in the commercial
setting, as well as to their anticompetitiveness.
The analysis suggested here is one means of following the Court's
guide. An agreement, if it produces excessive foreclosure, would
normally be unlawful. Yet even then, it should be necessary to study
108 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
109 Because the Clayton Act was enacted to stop practices in their incipiency which
would develop into Sherman Act violations, the Federal Trade Commission Act may
justifiably be said, under the Motion Picture analysis, to operate upon acts in their
incipiency which would develop into incipient violations of the Sherman Act.
110 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
111 Id. at 322. See also Luria Bros. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 829 (1968).
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the quality of the foreclosure as well as the quantity. If that review
continues to suggest unlawfulness, the business justifications should
then be analyzed to see whether in a particular economic context the
anticompetitive aspects might not by comparison be less weighty.
Finally, to the extent possible, the actual effects on competition should
be examined before declaring an exclusive agreement unlawful. Only
then, if the arrangement is having or will be likely to have adverse
effects on competition, should a finding of violation of the antitrust
laws follow.
In the case of many agreements, the entire analysis will not be neces-
sary, as the lawfulness will be established at an early stage. Where
agreements deserve proscription, the antitrust laws will have ultimately
been applied with the kind of rationality and attention to the real world
that are too often lacking in antitrust judgments. Businessmen will
then have only themselves, and their lawyers, to blame for any mis-
steps in at least this small corner of the vast antitrust thicket.
